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Introduction
Following World '!-lar II, the United States Merchant marine possessed un-
challenged hegemony at sea, but this wa r-d.nduc ed phenomenon was short lived.
The U. S. merchant marine, today, is struggling to attain physical and eco-
nomic health. but it is a formidable undertaking since approximately 95 per-
cent of U. S. ocean-borne trade is currently being carried by foreign flag
vessels.
The diminution of the American maritime posture is a perplexing matter
since it can be regarded, intuitively, as both unnatural and untimely. The
U. S. has a heritage of the sea that predates the founding of the Republic.
The oceans, and the ships that sail them, have been a prominent factor in
shaping virtually every crucial moment in our Nation's history.
Recent Presidentially-appointed national committees and commissions con-
~erned with development of a national ocean program have been cognizant of
~his inextricable link. Yet, in the course of their deliberations they con-
~ciously chose to exclude serious discussion of the marine transportation
1~ystem.
1"
••• the problems of the U. S. merchant marine ••• are extremely
complex and deserve more careful, concentrated thought than the
panel was able to contribute in light of the broad scope of the
~larine Resources and Engineering Development Act." [U. S.,
Commission on Harine Science, Engineering and Resources. Industr~
and Technology, Panel Report, vol , 2 (IJashington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office. January 1969). p. 45.]
"Of all the fundamental and pressing issues whfch HACOA wanted to
include in this Report, but did not. ~larine Transportation stands
out. However ••• it was next to impossible to examine the issues
and choices from an adequate perspective in the absence of a de-
tailed analysis of the maritime transportation system as it inter-
relates with problems of economic growth, social costs and benefits,
and environmental goals." [U.S •• National Advisory Committee on
Or .... "'" .,.",,1 " • A R~~--" f-n .. l:~ n_~_~A~~ .. ~~.1 "h~ r . _
~Washington~ D.C.: Government Printing Office. June 1~72), pp. v-vi
(Foreword). J
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At this point. an interpretation of ~lrine transportation system is
warranted. The Herchant 11arine Act of 1936 (as amended). through the use
of its regulatory and promotional powers. remains the principal mechanism
for maritime policy. Designed to "further the development. and maintenance
of an adequate and well-balanced American merchant marine. to promote the
commerce of the United States. to aid in the national defense." the Act
called for a strong merchant marine that woul d be:
sufficient to carry its domestic water-borne commerce
and a substantial portion of the water-borne export
and import foreign commerce of the United States • • •
capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary
in time of war or national emergency.
owned and operated under the United States flag by
citizens of the United States insofar as may be
practicaL
composed of the best-equipped. safest. and most
suitable types of vessels. constructed in the
United States and manned with a trained and ef-
ficient citizen personnel.
supplemented by efficient facilities for shipbuilding
and ship repair ••• 1
As used in this paper. the marine transportation system will focus
upon the "well-balanced" aspects of maritime activities. Emphasis '''ill
be placed on the carriage of uater-borne conunerce and related supportive
activities and industries. Although the ability of the merchant marine to
function as a naval and military auxiliary will not be specifically exam-
ined in this paper. a related aspect will be reviewed concerning the
foreign-flag vessels under so-called "Effective U. S. Control (EUSC)."
lSee Charles D. Baker. "Water Transportation and National Policy --
A Study in Success and Failure." Proceedings of the I1arine TechnoloS,l,
Society (September 1973). pp. 579-585.
3Hany factors have deterred national ocean-policy commlttees from
examining the issues associated with the U. S. marine transportation
system. The rationale for omission includes the embedment of the trans-
portation system in a complex and established legislative and bureau-
cratic framework; the extensive interaction of this industry with complex
international, political, economic and legal issues; and the enormity of
the developmental, investment, labor and international competitive prob-
lems which beset the industry.
This paper, with only the broadest of perspectives, attempts to make
some general comments concerning the economies of the marine transporta-
tion system and the interrelationships between marine transportation modes
and related industry.
---
The Multiplier Effect of Marine Transportation
and Related Industry
In developing this examination, it is intended to proceed on the
assumption that a marine transportation system and its related industry
have a multiplier effect on the national economy which might be a major
factor in determining the relative rate of increase of gross national
product among the nations of the world and, ultimately, be a major factor
in determining the relative national standings in per capita income.
To illustrate this supposition, it has been esti~ated that in the
ten-year period from 1958 to 1967, the beleaguered U. S. merchant marine
contributed $11.3 billion in quantifiable benefits to the nation at a
1
cost of $2.7 billion. This represents a net benefit of $8.6 billion,
or over $4 in benefit for each dollar of cost.
A supportive espousal also is offered by officials of the Maritime
Administration wherein they estimate that if all energy fuels and materials
needed by 1985 were to be imported on U. S. flag vessels, the subsidy cost
($8.1 billion) to the U. S. taxpayers of a shipbuilding/operating program
sufficient to carry these essential materials would generate the follo\ving
returns:
Ijames R. Barker and Robert BrundweLn, The United States ;·ferchant
Harine in National Perspective (Lexington, lIass.: Heath Lexington
Books, 1970).
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2.1 million raan-years of employment wouLd be
generated to build and operate the vessels
$20.3 blll1c. •. in wUb-<'> voul.d be paid to shIp-
yard and shipboard employees
$11.3 billion woul<1 be paid in income taxes
A $57 billion expansion in gross national
product (GNP) would be generated
$9.3 billion in balance-of-payments gain
would result.l
If this hypothesis is even partially correct, then there is cause
for grave national concern, for by any objective analysis, our progress
in the development of a marine transportation system is lagging behind
that of many other nations. This concern also must be extended to those
activities which are directly associated with marine transportation
the development of deep water ports and offshore oil terminals, the
establishment of integrated through services for unitized cargos, the
construction and repair of very-large and ultra-large tankers and
nuclear-powered merchant ships, the development of offshore commercial
and industrial facilities, the development of marine-based rapid transit
systems for the movement of goods and people, and the utility of Effective
U. S. Control (EUSC) ships in time of war or national emergency.
1
J. Kasputys and J. B. Young, "Subsidies, Seed ~·10ney, and
National Security," Sea Pm-ler (Washington. D. C.: Navy League
of the United States. September 1973). pp. 23-30. (Hereafter
referred to as Subsidies -- Sea Power.)
Review of Specific Areas of Concern
The aforementioned generalizations are made evident by a review
of specific areas of concern for a marine transportation system:
Transport of Oil
Unitized Cargos
Specialty Carriers and Offshore Platforms
Marine-Based Transit Systems
Shipbuilding and Ship Repair
Effective U. S. Control (EDSC) Ships
6
Transport of Oil
On a worldwide bn s Ls the trend in oil transportation has been t owar d
1the use of ships of increasing size and draft. Figure (1) clearly de-
rnonstrates the economy of scale associated "lith supertankers. The trend
to size must, however, be accompanied by deepwater port capabilities, and,
because no existing U. S. port has the requisite draft accommodations, the
supertanker has to date bypassed the United States. In advocating the
development of deepwater ports, President Nixon stated the following in
his Energy ~Iessage of 1973:
If W~ do not enlarge our deepwater port capacity,
it is clear that both American and foreign companies
will expand oil transshipment terminals in the Bahamas
and the Canadian Maritime Provinces. From these ter-
minals, oil \·;111 be brought to our co nvent LonaL ports
by growing numbers of sm~ll and medium size trans-
shipment vessels, therehy increasing the risks of
pollution from shipping operations and accidents.
At the same time, the United States will lose the
jobs and capital that those foreign facilities pro-
vide.
Given these considerations, I believe we must
move f orwa r d \"ith an ambitious program to create
new deepvater ports for receivinr, petroleum imports. 2
IU.S., Department of Commerca, iIaritime Administration,
The Economics of Deep\"ater Terminals O.,rashington, D. C.:
Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 5-8.
2president's Energy Hessage of April 18, 1973 to the
Congress of the United States.
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9In hi6 Energy Nessage of 1974, the Arab oil embargo notwithstanding,
President Nixon, again, made a strong appeal for appropriate legislation
to "permit the development of neH deepHater port facilities offshore."
He explained:
Even though our policy is to achieve self-
sufficiency, we will clearly continue to import
oil as long as it is availaLle at reasonable
prices. To enaLle us to import fuel more eco-
nomically, I have proposed Federal Government
licensing of the construction and operation of
deepwater port facilities three miles or more
at sea on the Outer Continental Shelf. The
main use of these facilities wouLd he to inport
crude oil in ships that nrc economically and
environmentally desirable, but are too deep of
draft to permit their entry into our port fa-
cilities on the East and Gulf Coasts.
This legislation would also eliminate many
of the legal uncertainties whf.ch nOH drive pri-
vate investors away from l.nerican waters and to
other nations of the Hestern Hemisphere. The
present system only serves to create investments
and jobs abroad and raises our costs of imported
oil, already high, even further • • • (the Arab
oil embargo) has opened our eyes to the short-
sighted policy (of excessive dependency on
foreign supplies of a vital good) 'ole had been
pursuing. l
Total tanker arrivals for the 48 contiguous states in 1971 numbered
67,700 \-lith 84 percent of these along the Eastern Seaboard. Hest Coast
arrivals amounted to 6.5 percent, and Gulf Coast arrivals were 9.5 percent
2
of the total. The cost of transporting oil to the U. S. East Coast is
shown in Table (1). At the present time (prior to the AraL oil embargo)
1President's Energy ~[essage of January 23, 1974 to the
Congress of the United States.
2Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Environmental Reporter
(Hashington, D. C.: Bureau of r.ational Affairs, Iric , , }!ay 1973),
p. 19.
II
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TABLE 1
COST OF OIL PER TON DELIVERED TO THE EAST COAST FROH OCEANIC SERVICES
(Foreign Flag Ships)
Existing Canadian Off- Off shore Island Offshore Island and
Situation shore Terminal and Pipeline Feeder Vessels
Cost of Ocean Freight 5.30 5.30 5.30
Transfer Charges .35 .65 .80
Transport to Refinery 1.13 .40 .38
I--'
0
Cost of Unloading .15 .15 .15
I
Cost of Pollution Control .15 .15 .15
Cost Oil Per Ton 10.85 7.08 6.65 6.78
,
(326,000 ton ship) (326,000 ton ship) (250.000 ton ship)
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Haritime Administration, Office of Research
and Development, Offshore Terrnin~l Development Project, September 1971.
I
:
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more than 104.000.000 tons of oil per year are transported by ship to the
1East Coast. Considering the differentials indicated in Table (1). an
annual cost savings of approx~mately $425 million per year could be real-
ized through the implementation of a super carrier/offshore terminal
system. Such a differential would war rant; a multi-billion dollar invest-
ment at current expectations for return on capital and. indeed. this is
supported by the number of offshore terminal studies now being conducted
2by private and local interests. Significantly, the legislation submitted
to Congress pursuant to the President's energy messages includes states,
political subdivisions and public or municipal corporations among the
entities that could be authorized to construct or operate deepwater port
faciiities beyond the three mile limit. 3
Concerning the investment of U. S. private capital in the requisite
super carriers, the Herchant !farine Act of 1970 has gone far to encourage
the development of a U. S. flag bulk carrier fleet capable of transporting
a reasonable proportion of our growing imports of petroleum and other bulk
commodities. 4 Indeed, the current shipbuilding "boom" in the United
1U.S., Department of Commerce, l1aritime Administration, Office
of Research and DevelopIaent, Offshore TerIainal DevelopMent Project
(tlashington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, Sep t ember 1971).
2Three deepwater terminals are presently under active consideration:
Sea Dock, near Freeport, Texas; LOOP, near Grande Isle, Louisiana; and
one off Delaware.
3For a general discussion of the various planning and arrangements
for offshore port financing see Duncan C. Gray, "Sources of Funds
Required," Planning for Offshore Ports (llashinr,ton, D. C.: ~farine
Technology Society, 1974).
4U• S., Congress, House, Report of the Activities of the Herchant
Harine and Fisheries Committee, 9~D Congress (Hashington, D. C.:
Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 11.
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1States is being fueled by the most liberal financing terms in history.
In contrast \vith the wo r Ldwd de financing available for ships, the credit- 0(.
worthy U. S. flag shipping transaction can merit 100 percent financing --
rather than the maximum 10 or 80 percent abroad; can be at a money cost
significantly lower -- by 3 to 5 percent; and, more important, can be a
fixed rate over a duration approximating the life of the ship (20 to 25
2years) rather than the 8 to 12 year term customary elsewhere.
By the mid-1980's, the United States will have to import between 50
to 60 percent of its petroleum products, as compared to the 26 percent
3we had currently imported prior to the oil embargo. In terms of balance
of payments, the United States imported $3.6 billion worth of energy fuels
in 1911 while exporting only $1.5 billion -- primarily coal. By 1985,
this balance-of-trade deficit for energy could rise to $25 billion
4
annually.
It should be generally conceded that the construction of cleepwat er
ports (be they monobuoys, fixed structures, floating or artificial islands
makes both economical and environmental sense. The critical questions
however concern tanker moveoents. It is, of course, obvious that for at
least the next decade, even with the President's Project Independence for
energy self-sufficiency, we will continue to be dependent upon foreign
1Harine Engineering/Log (Ne\V' York: Simmons Boardman Publishing
Corporation, October 1913), pp. 21-33.
2I bi d•
3U• S., Council on Environ~enta1 Quality, Energy and the
Environment (\1ashington, D. C.: Government Printing Office,
August 1913), p. 7.
4I b i d•
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sources for our energy supplies. Shall we risk a dual dependency by
becoming dependent upon foreign bottoms to transport these fuels to our
shores? As of December 31, 1971 the U. S. flag tanker fleet consisted
of 291 ships (both private and government ovned) with an average tonnage
of 27,000 DHT. l To carry the projected crude imports it is envisioned
that 200 supertankers (VLCC's) \~ill be needed, supplemented by 300 to 500
small shuttle tankers (although in some cases pipelines could be used)
for transshipment from U. S. offshore port facilities to major refineries
and distribution centers. 2 If offshore facilities are not constructed,
it has been estimated that 2,600 tankers, averaging about 47,000 D\IT each
to conform with existing port limitations on the East and Gulf Coasts,
3
would be required to meet future U. S. import requirements.
The crux of the problem is wha t should the "mix" be for the U. S.
flag tanker fleet, recognizing that the operating scenario lacks clear
definition. As of December 31, 1973, there were 49 tankers under con-
struction or on order. Of this total, 11 tankers are very large crude
carriers (VLeC's) ranging betueen 100,000 to 265,000 DHT; 13 are ap-
proximat.ely 90,000 mIT and 25 are less than 40,000 mIT. 4 About one-half
1
U. s., Departnent of Commerce, Haritine Administration,
A ~i2\-l \-,ave in American Shipping (\lashington, D. C.: Government
Printing Office, 1972), PI'. 72-73.
2Harine Engineering/Log (Hew York: Simmons Boardman
Publishing Corporation, April 1973), p. 5.
3aaritioe O-lasldngton, D. C.: AFL-ClO Naritime Trades
Departcent, Spring 1972), p. 5.
4U. S., Department of Commerce, ~1aritiT:le Administration
Tabulation, "Shipbuilding Contracts Under Xerchant Harine Act
of 1970," (1973).
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of these 49 tankers are covered by the Cost Differential Subsidy (CDS)
provision of the }ierchant Harine Act of 1970. CDS applications pending
before the ~Iaritime Administration' 6 Suhsidy Board include an additional
. 1
98 tankers ranging in size from 00, 000 mIT to 400, 000 DWT.
These ships probably \"ill be ready for sea in the 1975 - 1978 time
frame, and they will be looking for both adequate cargos and port facil-
ities. To insure that there will be available cargos there is mounting
sentiment in the Congress to pass legislation allocating a certain per-
centage of U. S. oil imports for carriage in U. S. flag tankers. During
the first and second sessions of the 92nd Congress, 182 Congressmen (42
percent of the House membership) sponsored or co-sponsored 26 separate
bills for allocating a certain percentage of U. S. oil imports for U. S.
flag ships. One bill (u.a. 13324) wouLd have required that 50 percent
of all U. S. oil imports be transported by U. S. flag ships. The ex-
pressed purpose of the bill was to "assure that the United States does
not become wholly dependent on foreign vessels for its rapidly increasing
oil imports with resultant adverse implications for our national security,
balance of payments, domestic economy, and marine environment. 1t Although
there was widespread Congressional support for this bill, it was defeated
in the Senate -- but only by seven votes. Similar legislation is now
before the 93rd Congress and is being actively considered.
lU. S., Department of Commerce, tmritime Administration
Tabulation, Itpending Construction Differential Subsidy
Application,1t (1973).
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Another factor which must be recognized concerning our tanker mix is
the eventual completion of the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline t~wse sea leg will
consist of 011 being transported from Valdez, Al.aska to I-Jest Coast r e-
fineries and to a Panama lstllmus transshipment point. Carrying oil be-
tween domestic ports (Valdez to West Coast ports) will be restricted tu
u. S. flag vessels as governed by the Herchant Ilarine Act of 1920 C'The
Jones Act"). Section 27 of that Act stipulates:
That no merchandise shall be transported by water, or
by land and wa t er , on penalty of forfeiture thereof,
between points in the United States, including
Districts, Territories, and possessions thereof em-
braced Hi thin the coa s twfse laws, either directly or
via a foreign port, or for any part of the transpor-
tation, in any other vessel than a vessel built in
and documented under the laws of the United States
and Otmed by persons who are citizens of the United
States • • •
The make-up of our tanker fleet is further complicated by the cur-
rent limitations associated with construction subsidies. The Merchant
t~rine Act of 1970 provides for a Construction Differential Subsidy (CDS)
to encourage U. S. built ships. Its success is evident with the order
backlog of U. S. shipyards at a peacetime high. In addition, pending CDS
applications, which totaled lSO ships (both tankers and non-tankers) as of
the first of this year, are far in excess of the 30 ships per year target
of the Act. llith CDS funding limited to $300 million annually, how should
1
the dollars be apportioned among the various vessel applicants?
lYor a discussion of this particular problem see Henry S. Harcus,
"The Need to Redefine the Objectives of the U. S. Ilar Lt Lme Subsidy Pro-
gran," Proceedings of the Harine Technology Society (September 1973),
pp. 565-577.
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The issue of government-subsidized tanker construction becomes more
perplexing when the environmental issue is introduced. Various environ-
mental groups, in 1~72, had obtained a court order to halt the contractinp,
for subsidized tanker construction until the :Iaritime Administration filed
1
an environcental impact statement. An impact statement was eventually
filed, under protest, and in the Fall of 1973, the environmentalists,
somewhat satisfied that certain environmental protection equipment (such
as anti-collision radar and inert-gas tank blanketing systems) ,~ere being
2
required, decided against further court action. The really expensive
requirements such as double bottoms and segregated ballast tanks are
still generally in abeyance. Although agreenent Has reached at the recent
Intergovernmental ~1aritime Consultative Organization for segregated bal-
last tanks in new tankers, the agreement does not become operative until
ratified by 15 or more countries representing 50 percent of world ton-
3
nage. Since CDS funding is limited by statute to a fixed percentage,
the imposition of environmental protection features either not required
or exceeding the standards of foreign ships could easily negate the value
of the CDS allowance. 4 The alternatives are then the establishment of
1Harine Engineering/Log (New York: Simcons Boardman Publishing
Corporation, October 1973), p. 9.
2I bi d •
3shipyard l"eekly ('i-lashington, D. C.: Shipbuilders Council of
America, llovember 8, 1973).
4
The Herchant Harine Act of 1970 provides for diminishing levels
of the Construction Differential Subsidy starting with 45% of domestic
building cost in 1971 and declining 2% each year until a maximum of 35%
is reached in 1976. The drop of the subsidy base will require a sub-
stantial reduction in the cost of ships constructed in U. S. shipyards.
17
uniform international standards, legislating an offsettinn adjustment in
the CDS percentage, or, all else failing, having tIle owner opt for the
less costly foreign flag vessel.
Let us consider one final facet of the oil transport picture --
refining capacity. In 1970. there were 268 refineries in the U. S. 'dth
an average daily capacity of about 50.000 barrels. To keep pace with the
projected demand, it has been deternined that we will require by 1980 the
equivalent of 58 new refineries with an average capacity of 160, 000 bar r eLs
1per day. To date, only one new refinery is under construction. Recog-
nizing the environmental pressures concerning refinery construction.
particularly since the preferred siting is generally in the already over-
burdened coastal zone, just how does the U. S. accor:unodate this needed
refining capacity. Perhaps offshore refineries offer the solution, par-
ticularly when it is desirable to have your refinery centers in proximity
to the areas of heaviest energy consumption. Consider the situation
today: the Gulf Coast currently has only 16 percent of the U. S. energy
demand. but has about 40 percent of the country's refining capacity.
The East Coast. on the other hand. has 40 percent of the demand but only
12 percent of the refining capacity.2 Although it has been estimated
that roughly a 50 percent expansion of refining capacity is possible at
existing sites. 3 perhaps the ultimate solution is the construction of
offshore refineries.
1Ocean Industry (Houston. Texas: The Gulf Publishing Company.
August 1972). pp. 38-44.
2I b i d •
3u• S•• Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality
The Fourth Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality
OJashington. D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 207-203.
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In any event, it is evident that oil transport offers tremendous
economic opportunities for the United States. How successful we \olill be
in realizing these economies depends upon our ability to treat our trans-
portation system in its totality -- a process which has yet to be ade-
quately demonstrated -- for. in summarizing. several issues remain to be
confronted and resolved. Specifically, ,",hat is needed includes the
fo l.l.owi.ng r
To enact appropriate lecislation to permit the construction
of deepwater, super tanker port facilities.
To assess U. S. flag tanker fleet requirenents (as well as
offshore port facility needs) in terms of Project Indepen-
dence • . • achieving self-sufficiency in energy by 1980.
To determine the major sources of oil. These sources could
range from the U. S. Outer Continental Shelf, the Arctic,
or Middle ~ast. Each of these sources places a different
set of requirements on the shipping industry and the tanker
mix.
To enact oil cargo preference legislation to insure a fixed
quota of the oil trade is reserved for U. S. flag tankers.
As expressed by the President's Commission on American
Shipbuilding:
Because of the increasing bilateral trade pressure
from developing and oil-producing nations, because
of the increasingly assertive participation of
state-owned fleets in shipping, and because of the
past reluctance of U. S. oil companies to build
and operate U. S. flag tankers, it appears neces-
sary that a quota of the petroleum and gas trade
be reserved for efficient and competitive U. S.
built. U. S. manned ships if the United States is
to l~ve a significant portion of this transporta-
tion under its control and to have the capability
to build and repair the necessary vessels. l
lReport of the Commission on American Shipbuildin& (Hashington,
D. C.: Government Printing Office, October 1973).
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To develop a national position in the event of pressure
from oil-producing nations to dictate oil carriaee re-
quirements. Again, quoting from the Repo rt; of the
Commission on American Shipbuilding:
The Department of State has pointed out, in
Congressional hearings, that Iraq and the
Arab Federation of Egypt, Libya, and Syria
have announced plans to establish oil tanker
fleets. Venezuela, KUHait, and Snudi Arabia
have also expressed similar goals. By virtue
of their control of the oil itself, there is
little doubt that the oil-producing nations
have the power to require that their tonnage
carry a portion of their oil exports • • •
The United States faces this world situation
without the national objertives \lhich are so
clear in other countries.
To review both the adequncy and apportionnent of
Construction Differential Subsidy (CDS) funds par-
ticularly in relation to world shipbuilding activity.
For example, at the end of 1973 there Here 3,359
merchant ships under construction or on order in the
major shipbuilding countries and tankers represented
75.7 percent of the tota1. Z As commented upon in
the Harine Engineering/Log:
H11ile nothing is certain in the shipping business,
the present uncertainties of the oil situation
\-lould se.em to indicate that this huge order book
of tankers is more than the \lor1d fleet Hould need
in the foreseeable future. 3
The Arab oil embargo has produced a panoply of energy-related issues,
and the character and viability of the U. S. merchant marine Hill be de-
termined by the pursuant policies and planning actions of the U. S. govern'"
mente
2Harine Engineerin{}/Log (Nom York: Simmons Boardman Publishing
Corporation, February 1974), p. 116.
Unitized Cargos
The techniques which have been pioneered by United States technology
include, initially, the pallet ship, the conta:l.ner ship, the barge-car rvf.ng
ship (LASH and SEABEE), and, ultimately, the nuc Lea r epower ed ba r ge-ica r ry t ng
ship. Figure (2) shows the economic advantages which accrue from imple-
mentation of each mode of unitization. The cost savings are large indeed.
The United States' experience with respect to the realization of the
economies of unitized cargos has again been one of bright promise accom-
panied by much frustration. The achievement of unitization brings with it
a substantially higher productivity per laborer on the docks and a blurrin!,
of distinction bet\leen teamster and longshoreman functions. As seen from
figure (2) this is not an incremental percentage gain in productivity but
a multiplication in prod~ctivity by factors as high as five.
As viewed by the unions, parsimony ,~ith respect to sharing the bene-
fits of such modernization with labor resulted in a costly national strike
in 1972 which affected the balance of trade and delayed the national real-
1ization of the economics of unitization. Additional difficulties have
resulted from the manner in which container ships must operate. Specif-
ica11y, the economics of an efficient container ship operation dictate
lIn 1972, two longshore contract disputes caused a lJ5-day work
stoppage at Pacific Coast ports and a 57-day stoppaee at Atlantic and
Gulf Coast ports. [See U. S•• Department of Commerce, naritime
Administration, A Ne,~ \~ave in American Shipping (Hashington, D. C.:
Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 37.]
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FIGURE (2)
TOTAL PORT COST PER TON FOR BREAK-BULK AND UNITIZED SHIPS
(All Units Door to Door)
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* The total port cost per ton for the container ship is
that of the combined roll-on/roll-off. lift-on/lift-off
container berth.
SOURCE: Arthur D. Little. Inc •• Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development.
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keeping the number of port calls to a minimum. Cargos can be funneled to
their ultimate destinations through a relatively sm3ll number of ports with
economic advantages to the carrier. This. of course. presents a serious
problem to those ports being denied direct vessel services. This poses the
threat of ports claiming unjust discrimination and seeking recourse through
1the Federal regulatory agencies. These same regulatory agencies. specif-
ically the Federal ~~ritirne Commission and the Interstate Commerce
Commission. are also trying to resolve conflicting regulatory statutes
which are inhibiting the optimum movement of unitized cargos. At present.
intennodal freight cannot be shipped through to its destination using a
single bill of lading and a single rate.
To correct this situation. H.R. 15465 (liThe Intermodal Bill") was
introduced in the 92nd Congress to facilitate "through interrnodal freight
movements involving offshore marine transportation." The bill wo uld create
a nev type of carrier -- the "InterI:lodal Carrier" who would offer a
through service to the shipper utiliziuf, a single bill of lading. quoting
one simple rate for the entire shipment from point of origin to point of
destination. and being fully responsible for all liability concerning the
shipment.
In providing this service." the Intermodal Carrier. in addition to
utilizing its o~m facilities. could also utilize the facilities of other
"underlying carriers. 1I The Intermodal Carrier could be a rail carrier. a
1U. S•• Federal ~britirne Commission. Tenth Annual Report
(Washington. D. C.: Governmen t Printing Office. 1971). pp. 15-16.
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motor carrier, or an ocean carrier. Thus, an ocean carrier acting as an
Intermodal Carrier could offer a through service at a single rate for a
shipment from reoria, Illinois to Milan, Italy uSlne an unaerlying rail
carrier to the Port of New York, then its ovn vessel from NC\-7 York to a
port in Italy, and then to 11i1an using the facilities of an Italian inland
transportation system, either rail or motor carrier. The obvious aclvantag
of this method is the shipper deals only with one carrier (the Intermoda1
Carrier), is quoted one rate, uses only one shippine document, and looks
only to the Intermoda1 Carrier to resolve what eve r problems may arise.
Regulatory responsibility over the through movement and through rate would
be vested in the Federal ?~ritime Commission.
The increasing use of containers has necessitated expansion at sev-
eral U. S. ports. Prompting such moves usually is the substantial acreage
needed for container marshalling yards. Recognizing the growf.ng expense
and difficulties associated with coastal zone land acquisition for in-
dustrial usage, the employment of heavy-lift helicopters could offer a
viable alternative. Specifically, marshalling yards could be placed
further inland witl! the helicopter prOViding the transportation link be-
tween the yard and port. This system would ease both the strain of coasta
zone development and motor-carrier traffic to and from the port.
As shown in figures (3), (4), (5) and (6) the United States has
experienced and continues to experience a declining share of the trans-
portation market. As compensating factors, the U. S. is no,,, the leader
in barge-on-board (or lighter-aboard) ships (LASH and SEABEE) and an
increase in domestic shipbuilding has been experienced as a result of the
"u. S. FLAG HERCHANT SHIPS - PRIVATELY OHNED
(Foreign and Domestic Trades)
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FIGURE (4) U.S. OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE:
COMMERCIAL CARGO CARRIED [TONNAGE]
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CALENDAR YEAR 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1958 1969 1970 1971'
Total Tons (Millions)
U.S. Flag Tons
U.S. Percent of Total
289.3 253.3 267.0 277.9 272.4 296.8 311.6 332.8 371.3 392.3 387.6 418.6 426.1 473.2 456.9
50.8 30.9 27.1 31.0 26.3 29.6 28.5 30.5 27.7 26.2 20.5 25.0 19.1 25.2 24.3
17.6 12.2 10.2 11.1 9.7 10.0 9.2 9.2 7.5 6.7 5.3 6.0 4.5 5.3 5.3
liner TOlal Tons
liner U.S. Flag Tons
liner U.S. Percent
46.7 43.4 48.1
17.8 14.0 13.5
38.0 32.3 28.1
50.7 49.0 48.3
14.5 12.6 12.7
28.6 25.8 26.2
48.9 50.3 49.2
13.5 14.2 11.2
27.7 28.1 22.8
49.9 47.9
11.4 10.6
22.9 22.2
46.1 41.0
11.1 9.2
24.0 22.6
50.4
11.8
23.5
48.8
10.3
21.0
Non-Liner Total Tons
Non-liner U.S. Flag Tons
Non-liner U.S. Percent
135.1 105.1 106.9 109.0 106.7 125.2 136.2 161.4 171.6 189.5 190.4 209.5 211.6 240.7 216.2
16.2 8.8 8.2 8.4 7.8 8.3 8.2 9.8 8.2 6.9 5.4 6.4 4.4 5.4 4.7
12.0 8.4 7.7 7.7 7.3 6.7 6.0 6.1 4.8 3.6 2.8 3.0 2.1 2.2 2.2
Tanker Total Tons
Tanker U.S. Flag Tons
Tanker U.S. Percent
107.5 104.8 112.0 118.2 116.7 123.3 126.5 121.1
16~ 8~ 5.4 8~ 5~ 8.5 6~ 6~
15.7 7.6 4.8 6.9 5.1 6.9 5.4 5.4
150.5 152.8 149.3 163.1 173.5 182.1
8.2 7~ 4.5 7.5 5.5 8~
5.5 5.2 3.0 4.6 3.2 4.4
192.0
9.4
4.9
"Prehminarv data subject to future revision.
SOURCE: U. S., Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration,
A New Wave in American Shipping, 1972.
FIGURE (5) U. S. OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE:
COMMERCIAL CARGO CARRIED [DOLLAR VALUE]
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1957 1958 19591960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
CALENDAR YEAR 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971'
Total Value ($ billions) 22.8 20.9 22.8 24.7 24.7 25.9 27.5 30.0 32.4 36.4 36.6 41.1 41.7 49.7 50.7
U.S. Flag Value ($ billions) 7.3 6.0 6.0 6.5 6.3 6.5 6.9 7.7 6.9 8.2 7.9 8.5 8.0 10.3 10.0
U.S. Percent of Total 32.1 28.6 26.1 26.4 25.6 25.1 25.1 25.8 21.4 22.5 21.7 20.7 19.2 20.7 19.8
Liner Total Value 16.4 15.3 16.8 18.5 18.3 18.9 19.5 21.3 22.3 24.8 24.8 26.8 27.0 33.5 33.0
Liner U.S Flag Value 6.4 5.4 5.5 5.9 5.7 5.8 6.2 7.0 6.2 7.5 7.4 7.8 7.4 9.7 9.3
Liner U.S. Percent 39.1 35.3 32.5 32.1 31.4 30.1 31.5 32.8 27.8 30.4 29.8 29.0 27.3 28.8 28.2
Non-Liner Total Value 4.0 3.4 3.7 3.6 3.7 4.3 5.2 5.9 6.6 8.2 8.6 10.8 11.0 12.2 12.8
Non-Liner U.S. Flag Value .5 .3 .3 .3 .4 .4 .5 .5 .4 .4 .4 .5 .4 .4 .4
Non-Liner U.S. Percent 12.6 9.2 8.4 9.0 10.6 9.6 9.6 8.6 6.3 4.9 4.5 4.6 3.8 3.3 3.5
Tanker Total Value 2.4 2.2 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 3.5 3.4 3.2 3.4 3.6 4.0 4.9
Tanker U.s Flag Value .4 .3 .2 .3 .2 .3 .2 .2 .3 .3 .2 .2 .2 .2 .3
Tanker U.S. Percent 16.8 11.4 7.5 10.4 7.3 9.4 9.0 8.8 8.2 7.7 4.8 6.6 5.2 5.6 5.7
-Prcliminarv data subject to future revision.
Note: Includes Covcrnmcru sponsored cargo; excludes Department of Defense cargo and U.S./Canada translakcs cargo.
SOURCE: U. S•• Department of Commerce. Haritime Administration.
A New Wave in American Shipping. 1972.
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Herchant Harine Act of 1970. Although American shipbuilding is at a rec-
ord peacetime high, nothing has yet transpired to indicate that the new
capabUity \"Ul do more than maintain current relative world ranking of
the fleet.
from utilization of large size, nuclear-powered ships in commercial ser-
$2.50 a barrel, and it is expected that costs will shortly hit $9.00 a
Bunker fuel prices are now 200% more than the 1972 price of
Recognizing that this comparative analysis \-I8S prepared before the
IOf additional concern is the trend of events wi t h respect to nuclear 11
merchant ships. As shown in figure (7), short-term economic gain accrues \
I
I
\
current oil shortage, circumstances nov appear to be combining to make more:
at tractive the poss iL ility of eonst rue t ing nucLea r-powered U. S. f Lag mer-I!
IIchant ships.
vice.
1barrel.
The Federal Haritime Cor:unission is currently seeking to hammer out a
formula which will permit steamship lines and carrier groups to impose
bunker fuel surcharges to offset the skyrocketing cost of operating mer-
chant ships. These escalating bunker fuel prices are also causing ship
operators, as an economy measure, to limit the number of U. S. ports ser-
viced at a time when the devaluation of our dollar is increasing the amount
of U. S. exports, particularly to Western Europe.
Legislation is now before Congress (H.R. 7694) that would establish
a nuclear merchant ship incentive support program by providing federal
support payments to cover "such portion of the construction cost difference
arising from the use of nuclear propulsion units • • • necessary for the
purpose of fostering the advance of U. S. flag maritime technology. "
lLarry C. Hanning, "Atoms at Sea," Sealift (\-lashington, D. C.:
!'Iilitar S~alift COIllI!l~nd. Januar
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Such p<lyments tvou1d be repayed by the recipients throueh recapture of 20
percent of the nuclear ship's annual net operating income until tile full
1
amount of incentive pa}~ents are recovered.
Although the prospects for building nuclear merchant ships appear
brighter, the Administration does not support the program envisioned by
H.R. 7694 because of lingering questions as to economic feasibility,
licensing and regulation, safety, financial responsibility, third party
?
liability, indemnification Lfmf t s and international reactions. ~
Neam"hi1e, the foreign trend t ovard nuc Lea r-epower ed ships, as ill us-
trated by figure (8), continues. Unless the United States shortly over-
comes its current cautious approach, it will lead to domination in this
area by Japan, \-lest Germany, and !lussia. If this occurs, it will serve
as another example of \vhere the U. S. failed to exploit its technological
lead, thus allo\1ing others to acquire the doninant positions. (For added
emphasis, it should be noted that the nuclear pouer plant of the West
German ship Otto Hahn is a U. S. designed system.)
IIhe cost estimates vary for construction of a nuclear-powered
merchant ship, as compared to a conventionally-powered ship. For
example, a 400,000 D~~ conventionally-po~1ered tanker costs approxi-
mately $125 million. Estimates for a comparable nuclear-powered
ship range from $40 to $100 million more.
2Shipyard Heekly (Hashington, D. C.: Shipbuilders Council of
America, ~Iovember 8, 1973).
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f~RADts advanced nuclear propulsion system competitive
now at high power levels.
Growing industry interest coupled with cautious
government attitude.
Government and industry aggressively pursuing international
market.
Exploring possibility of joint nuclear shipbuilding proeram
with British interests.
P.&D continuing on advanced reactor technology for 1980 - 1990
propulsion systens.
Very .:lggressive government industry program.
Projecting market of 300 nuclear containerships in
period 1980 - 2000.
LENDI was wo r Ld l s first nuclear powered ice breaker.
ARKTIN\ is first ship of a series of two advanced nuclear
powered ice breakers.
Conmercial propulsion activity not known.
...
Design studies only.
Varying degrees of interest and capability.
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Specialty Carriers and Offshore Platforms
Accompanying the development of supertankers and cargo ships has been
an additional class of specialty carriers. These include LNG (liquid
natural gas) ships, aBO (ore/bulk/ore) ships, RO/RO (roll-on/roll-off)
carriers, mobile offshore drilling rigs, oceangoing tug-supply vessels,
workover units and pipe burying barges. The full panoply of industrial
ships of massive scale has resulted in the movement of heavy industry to
the coastal zone in order to minimize transportation costs and optimize
on ocean transport. This has been particularly true in Japan, the
1Uetherlands, Sweden, and Germany. In major sllipyard modernization alone,
future investment plans are expected to total more than $350 million be-
cause of the interest of American shipyards in entering the world market
for the construction of LNG ships and the requirements of the Alaskan oil
2
trade.
Such developments have not been without effect beyond purely economic
tenus. Each new and expanded industry has resulted in a consumptive use
of the already crowded coastline and has. added to the pollution problem of
bays and estuaries. The logical step beyond coastal location is that
of outward movement to fixed or floating stable platforms or artificial
IV. S., Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers, Institute
fur \~ater Resources, Foreign j)eep \later Port Developments, 3 vols
(December 1971).
2U• S., Department of Conunerce, :laritime Adrad.n Ls t r a t ion, A new
Have in Ar.lerican Shipping (\.Jashington, D. C.: Government Printing
Office, 1972), p. 13.
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Lo l.ancla Loc a t cd uell beyond interference \J:!.th other competing uses of the
zone. Accompany Lng this industrial novcmen t has been the development of
platform and island designs for a multitude of functions.
An analysis of both stahle platforms and artificial islands in marine
enterprises has demonstrated their cost effectiveness in such applications
as offshore petroleum drilling, oil refineries and storage, ocean mining
and dredging, fishing and fis11 processinz, energy generation, harbors, air-
ports, oceanographic research stations, and even urban living and recreatioT
1
centers. Integration of these functions, Hhere feasible, on single plat-
forms or in platform complexes could achieve the full economic benefit and
enhance the investment.
United States development in this total set of industrial complexes
is presently liI:lited to the offshore oil platform and offshore oil storage,
and a few specific projects, such as offshore deepwa t e r port facilities
2for VLCC's and floating nuclear power plants. Aside from these, a coheren
and total national program for ocean platform development does not now ex I s •
In evaluating the significance of this deficiency, it should be reempha~ize
that offshore facilities locate industries for which pollution control on
land is difficult, if not \lell nigh impossible, in a controllable environ-
ment, and provide structures in vater s whLc h , wLt ho ut dredging, are deep
1
H. R. Talkington, "Transfer of Navy Platform Technology to Solution
of Societal Problems," Journal of the :!arine Technology Society (January -
February 1973), pp. 56-60; G. Schreuder and C. Stigter, Sea Island Project
(N.V. Holland: Bos Kalis Westminster Dredging Group, ~~rch 1972).
2
u. S., National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere, Second
Annual Report of the ~':ational Advisory COr.u:littee on Oceans and Atmosphe.re
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, June 1973), pp. 16-23.
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enough to qualify as deep",ater harbors. The cost of .:.uch facilities nppeClrs
to be competitive if not super Lor to coastal counterparts, and they can be
built \-lithout uprooting and Lnt er r erLng Hith existing enjoyment of the land
and coastal zone. A further advantaee of floating facilities is their
ability to be relocated in response to demographic change.
-"====»=========================-==1F==--·
Marine-Based Transit Systems
No discussion of marine transportation would be complete without some
reference made to the movement of goods and people to the coastal zone and
to the inland.
There are more than 25,000 miles of navigable i.n1and waterways
serving almost every concentration of the nation's heavy industry and
its most efficient farming areas. It has been cstiI'l8ted that on the
river one dollar will produce 300 miles of service; by rail, the same
amount will produce 66 miles and by truck, 15 miles. l These economies
can best be seen in the fact that inland barges perform ten percent of
the inter-city ton miles and receive in revenues half of one percent of
?
the nation's freight bill. ~ lHth a national annual inter-city freight
bill of approximately $80 billion, there is an inherent national poten-
tial for savings whLch is measured in billions of dollars if substantial
increments of inter-city freight are shifted from land to water. The
trend has been for industries to move to the river bank wher e they can
take direct advantage of the economies of barge transportation for their
raw materials and products. But, almost as important, they can play the
lJ. A. Cr eedy , "The Potential of Our Inland ~"aterway,"
Proceedings of the ~~rine Technology Society (September 1973),
pp. 401-408.
2
Ibid.
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barge lines against the railroads and achieve so-called "wa t cr-ecompe l.Lcd"
rail rate reductions. Such reductions ranee up to 60 percent and have
1tended to accelerate the movement of industry to the river banks.
The advent of the container sh:l.p and harge/1ighter ship have hrought
a net" international dimension in international trade to the river system.
For containerized cargos, ocean carriers and inland transportation com-
ponies have developed facilities and procedures for handling intermoda1
movements to and fron the ports. But intermoda1ism has not developed as
rapidly as has been hoped for in the United States. The principal prob-
1em is caused by the conflicting standards of our rer,ulatory laws. Thus
far, carriers have only extended through services under single factor
rate-making to so-called landbridge and ninihridge services hetween ports
Truly integrated services are not yet offered to and from inland points
under through rate and through route arrangeMents. The greatest cha1-
lenge facing our ocean shipping system is to begin to accept general
cargo ocean transportation as a link in an integrated "origin-to-
2
destination" system. If containerization is to approach its true
potential, regulatory impedinents must he resolved.
Correspondingly, the barge carrying ships (LASH and SEABEE) have
served to extend shipping services to river ports or other ocean ports
which could not accommodate the deep-draft "nother ship". Like the
container ship, these vessels open a neu means of through transportation.
IJ. A. Creedy, "The Potential of Our Inland H'atertJay,"
Proceedings of the Harine Technology Society (September 1973),
pp. 401-408.
2R• P. lIolubowicz, "The Challenge Facing the Ocean Shipping
Industry, II Haritime Reporter/Engineering Neto1S (~ray 15, 1972),
pp. 19-21.
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Eighty percent of the metropolitan areas in the United
States are located near a body of water -- an ocean.
lake. river. estuary. sound. or bay. Some 90 million
people live and work close to water. In view of these
facts it is not surprising that it appears feasible to
expect that by 1980 one-half million urbanites in some
30 cities could utilize over-the-water craft daily as
their primary mode of transportation. Stich a turn of
events would result in 200.000 fewer private cars in
downt.own business areas daily. 12.000 new jobs in
manufacturing and operatin~ the system. a higher
quality of life for many city dwellers. and a number
of secondary benefits not yet clearly perceived. l
The reality of the situation. however , 11'1 that the movement of people has
undergone the same characteristic development dilemna that has been seen
in the other forms of maritime COmr:lerce. U. S. technology has developed
hydrofoil craft. air-cushion vehicles. surface-effect vehicles. and
captured-bubble craft. At present. though. few if any of these advanced
I
marine craft are in commercial service in the United States. In contrast~
I
the Soviet Union has more than JOO regularly scheduled commercial hydro-
foil services operatin~ on its inland waterways and canals. Cities of
the United States are similarly linked. and the development of marine
2
mass transit should be developed as a viable transportation mode. It
1U. S •• Department of Transportation. Urban Nass Transportation
Administration. Over-the-Water Program Design. by P... Krzyczkows kf ,
Report No. UHTA-r;~T-RDC-8-71-l (December 1971).
2public Law 92-374 ("Hydrofoil Ships"). enacted in 1972. acknowl-
edges the perfection of the hydrofoil concept to the point where large.
high speed (over 40 knots) ships may be built for the carriage of freight
and passengers. The Act. therefore. permits favorable Federal ship
nortgage insurance for hydrofoils and other surface-effect ships whLch
meet nininum speed and horsepower requi.rements wi t hou t regard to tonnage.
38
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should be noted that the benefits whLch could accrue from the development I
of such a system have drawn the notice of industry and various cities.
Hawa I f , for example, is studying the Il3\vC\ii Environmental Area tk1SS
Transi t (HEART) System whLch \,ri1l utilize the ocean as the expres svay
with bO.:lts operating on the existing canals and streams for the local
1
loops.
An integrated marine-based transit system contains the seeds of
promise for energy .conservation and for the solution of a large number
of coastal energy consumptive and environmental coastal zone problems
less energy per ton-mile than any other method of freight distribution.
of our society.
1
For example, water transportation harge service requires I
If
Water freight requires 500 BTU's of energy for every ton-mile of freight
moved; rail freight requires 750 BTU's per ton-mile; pipelines 1,850
BTU's per ton-mile; trucks 2,400 BTU's of energy per ton-mile; and air
cargo 6,300 BTU's per ton-mile. 2 Several studies have also demonstrated
the efficacy of a water-oriented mass transit system. 3
Coupled wLt h the movement of freight and people is the advent of
offshore oil terminals and a projected (by the end of the century)
1,000 nuclear power plants, the ~ajority of which, in all probability,
~1. A. Lucas, "l-Iarine Hass Transit for Hawa Ld, A Case Study,"
Proceedings of the }~rine Technology Societ~ (September 1973),
pp. 377-383.
2Big Load Afloat (Washington, D. C.: American Waterways
Operators, 1973).
3See William H. Shultz, "Status of Domestic High-Speed :Iarine
Vehicles for Hass Transit," Proceedings of the :1arine Technology
Societl (September 1973), pp. 409-419.
on Oceans and Atmosphere,
Government Printing Office,
\1
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1\.ri11 be locatcd offshorc on floating platforms. What is therefore
suggested. is that the surface of the ocean. the coastal zone. and the
coastal canals and waterwaya be reserved for rapid marine transit of
goods, s.e.rviccs and people be tween offshore facilities, from offshore
facilities to the shore. and between coastal, riverine, and canal
2
coramunities.
If the marine transit system could be developed on a national
scale, it could help solve many urban and industrial problems of the
coastal zone.
lU. S., National Advisory Corr~ittee
Second Annual Report (1Jashington. D. C.:
June 1973).
2John P. Craven, "Offshore Platforms and Superports: Technical
Considerations," The Oceans and National Economic Development
(~'lashin8ton, D. C.: Government Printing Office, December 1973),
pp. 230-232.
Shipbuilding and Ship Repair
In reviewing the shipbuilding and ship repair capabilities of the
United States, which, of course, are major components of the maritime
industry, discussion will be focused on tankers since they represent the
cOn1ncrcial behemoths.
\vhereas, in recent history, with fet-! exc ep t Loris , Amer i can shipyards
were building small tankers in the range of 30,000 - 50,000 DHT, the
orderbook today for the U. S. shipbuilding industry includes tankers up
to and including 265,000 m:T. Additionally, there nrc app l Lca t Ions
pending for tankers in the ultra-large category (400, 000+ m~T).
T\-1O shipyards -- Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Spar r ows Point,
:~ryland and Seatrain Shipbuildine Corporation. Brooklyn, New York
are currently engaged in the construction of 265,000 mrr and 225,000 mIT
VLCC's, respectively •. Bethlehem has recently indicated that 350,000 D1IT,
1
or slightly larger, VLCC's may be built at Spa r r ows Point.
The new facilities in three other yards \.,ill be able to accommodate
even larger vessels. llewport Ne\"s Sh Lpbu LldLng Corporation, l':e\-!port NeHS
Virginia will be able to build VLCC's as large as 600, 000 mIT. Avondale
Shipyards, Incorporated, He\" Orleans, Louisiana and Sun Shipbuilding and
Dry Dock Company, Chester, Pennsylvania could construct 1.00, 000 mIT
VLCC's.2
lEdwin H. Hood, Speech delivered before the Propeller Club
of Newpo r t News , Virginia, 12 December 1973.
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Another shIpyard -- Touu Shipyards Corporation, Galveston, Texas --
has completed plans for a np\'! f ac tl ity c apab l,e of bui1dinr; ULCC' s , In
addition, the existing facilities of General Dynamics Corporation, Quincy
(l'lassachusetts) Shipbuild:l.ng Division and Ingalls Shipbuilding Divir.ion of
Litton Industries, Incorporated, Pascagoula, Mississippi, could he adapted
1for the construction of 225,000 DIIT and 265,000 n~IT VLCC's, respectively.
HUh the exception of the SS Hnnhattan of 110,000 DHT delivered in
late 1962, American shipyards have been building the supertankers of yester
day. Today, the U, S. shipbuilding Industry is moving into a new era of
production capabilities and rapidly moving toward new market opportunities
for the supertankers of tomo r row
The ambiguities of present-day \lor1d oil diplomacy not\'lithstandinp"
the international demand for t anlce r transport of oil and p,as is not ex-
pected to subside, It has been forecast that the Hor1d tanker fleet \1il1
increase, on a tonnage basis, by 4,7 percent each year until 1990, nut the
characteristics of that fleet \-1il1 change considerably, In 1975, it has
been predicted that 47 percent of the tonnage of these tankers ,·Ji1l be
vessels of 150,000 DlIT and over, The comparable figure in the same cate-
gory for 1980 has been placed at 65 percent, and for 1990 at 76 percent.
It is interestinp, to note that, as of mid-1973, there were nearly 500
the wo r Ld,
tankers of 150,000 mIT and over under construction or on order throughout
2Included were more than 20 ULCC's of 400,000 DIIT and over,
- - -------------
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Turning for a moment to the U. S. capability for construction of
nuclear-powered merchant ships. at least four of the aforementioned 5hip-
yards possess the know-how to build nuclear merchant ships, and at least
four U. S. producers of reactors possess the know-how to engage in marine
applications of nuclear power. Unfortunately. the technological lead ac-
quireu as a result of building and operating the NS Savannah, the world's
first nuclear-powered merchant vessel, has been quickly lost by default.
Our national follow-up, to date, has been confined to a comparatively low
level of study effort. :-reanwhile. from the baseline of U. S. nuclear
these portents. With the troublesome shortfalls in energy supplies. the
legislation now before Congress (B.R. 7694) has a special relevance.
Efficient transportation under U. S. jurisdiction and the capabilities to
build in our own shipyards. ships of maximum productivity reflecting our
superiority in nuclear techno Logy are important to a rational solution of
our pressing energy needs. It has been estimated, for example. that to
operate a fleet of 300 (the numerical objective of the Herchant Harine Act
of 1970) fossil-fueled modern merchant ships over their design lifetime
will require more than the estimated resources of the entire commercial
1Alaskan North Slope oil field. Considering these requirements. passage
of H. R. 7694 could well prompt the construction of high speed nuclear
merchant ships.
1Subsidies -- Sea Pm ... e r ,
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together with their strainers and fastenings.
intervals also require drydocking, as do some damage surveys.
underwater portions of a hull, rudder, propeller and propeller shaft, and
surveys, the stern, keel, stem, frame or stern post, rudder, and outside
Special periodical surveys at four-year
for scraping and painting a hull hottom, a ship must be made "high and
is usually checked at this time.
there are fifteen repair yards \·lith seventeen drydocks of 300,000 DWT
2
capacity or over.
===::::#:=======================--=-=r- ==
The c.hanging character of the world fleet brings us to the subject of I
ship repair capability. For maintenance such ClR routine voyage repairs, I
::S:::Sw::-::rb:n:"::::t:no:tt:em::::~g :~:Y;o:U~::::c::::S:::Yr::a::eo:e::: .1
I!
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I
Idry." In addition, classification societies require that, for maintenance I
of class, vessels be surveyed in drydock at specified intervals. On these
II
II
1'1plating are cleaned and examined with propellers, streets, and sea chests, I,
II[The stern bearing clearance
II
I
Because of I
th is. t h e sLz es of a repair yard's drYdo:ks and the cranes serving them arell
the measures of their yard's "capacity." II
bUiltI:oa:c:::::d:::t:::p:O::::i:::.:::s::n:.:::~::of:::~it::Sp:::e::~ng I
(See figure 9) JI
Unfortunately, the capacity of U. S. private ship repair yards to dry
dock VLCC's/ULCC's is presently limited. No commercial facilities are
available on the East Coast, though a drydock capable of lifting 120,000
lSurveyor (HeH York: American Bureau of Shipping, November 1973),
p. 8.
EXISTIHG !\i1D rltOPO~)ElJ HErA Tn nnYll()CIZ~;
FOR VESSELS OVEl~ JOO,OOO mIT
Figure 9
Country
Bahrain
Brazil
Dubal
France
Germany
Grand Canary Is.
Holland
Italy
Japan
Malaysia
Malta
Portugal
Senegal
Yard and
Location
New yard
New dock RIo area
Dubai Drydock
Terrin Marseilles
Blohm & Voss Hamburg
New yard
Verolme Rotterdam
CNTR/OARN Genoa
CNTR Palermo
SEBN Naples
Hakodate Hakodate
Hitachi Sakai
IHI Aioi
IHI Taniyama
IHI Yokohama
Kawasaki Sakaide
Koyo Mihara
Mitsubishi Honmoku
Mitsubishi Koyagi
Mitsubishi Nagasaki
Mitsui Yura
Nippon Kokan Tsu
Nippon Kokan Kiire
Sasebo Sasebo
Malaysia SY Johore Bahru
Malta Drydocks
Lisnave Lisbon
Setenave Setubal
New yard
Maximum
Dock Dock Depth over
Length Width keel blocks Capacity
(in It) (in It) (in It) (in dwt)
NA NA NA 400,000
NA NA NA 400,000
1,361 243 40 500,000
1,361 216 40 500,000
1,722 328 40 1.000,000
1,535 281 NA 700,000
1,149 184 30 300,000
Two docks of 300.000 and 500.000
1,329 295 35 500.000
1,155 260 33 350,000
1,220 225 NA 400,000
1,320 240 NA 500.000
1,132 190 26 300,000
1,493 207 36 400,000
1,115 184 26 300,000
NA NA NA 1,000,000
1,174 184 28 300,000
1,476 236 27 500,000
1,148 184 NA 300,000
1.148 190 29 400,000
1.312 328 NA 500,000
1,155 185 31 300,000
1,150 213 33 330,000
1.230 246 30 500,000
NA NA NA 1,000,000
1.214 230 49 500,000
1,270 264 NA 400,000
1,260 200 NA 300,000
1,148 177 34 326,000
1,180 177 20 326,000
1,706 295 40 1,000,000
1,150 180 NA 300,000
1,485 245 NA 700,000
Three docks from 300-500,000
Status
1975 opening
NA
1976 opening
1976 opening
1976 opening
1974 opening
In operation
Possible 1976 completion
In operation
NA
1975 completion
NA
In operation
In operation
In operation
1978 opening
In operation
In operation
1974 completion
In operation
In operation
In operation
In operation
In operation
Possible 1978 opening
In operation
1975 completion
Construction begins 1974
In operation
In operation
In operation
1974 opening
i 974 opening
NA
Singapore
S. Africa
Spain
United States
Hitachi-Robin
Jurong
Mitsubishi-Singapore
Sembawang
New yard Saldanha Bay
Astilleros Esparioles Cadiz
Todd Shipyards Galveston
1,190
1,160
NA
1,260
1,340
NA
1,416
215
185
NA
210
265
NA
216
NA
NA
NA
30
NA
NA
33
400,000
300,000
400,000
477,000
400,000
400,000
380,000
1975 opening
In operation
Possible 1975
1974 opening
Possible 1976 completion
1974 completion
NA
NA -- Not Available SOURCE: Surveyor (rie'" York: American Bur eau of
Shipbuilding, ~ovember 1973), p. 15.
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DWT tankers is contemplated at Baltimore. ~~rylDnd. None are available on
the Gulf Coast. thour,h a repair dock. designed to handle VLCC's up to a
maximum of 380.000 DWT is planned at Galveston. Texas. On the West Coast
most tankers up to 150.000 D~IT and some as large as 230,000 DtIT can now be
1drydocked at San Francisco, California.
Advances in shipbuilding technology are only as valuable as comparable
gains in repair yard and drydocking facilities. illlile the revenue for an
active VLCC/ULCC can be considerable, so can its losses Hhen it is tied up
waiting for maintenance or repairs. OHners and operators want to be sure
that suitable drydocking and repair facilities Hill be available, when
required, for the supertankers they may contemplate ordering.
The U. S. shipbuilding industry has developed the capabilities to
build VLCC' sand ULCC' s , IJo\.,1 the ship repair industry must make its own
contribution to the development and operation of the new supertankers.
\-lith the increasing size of tankers and the prospect of U. S. offshore
terminals, it would be illogical if the ship repair facilities of the
United States, recognizing the economic implications, did not keep abreast
of these trends.
1
Edwf.n N. Hood, Statement before Committee on Herchant Har Lne and
Fisheries, House of Representatives, 11 July 1973.
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Eftective U. S. Control (EUSC) Ships
No discussion of the U, S. merchant marine ..zou Ld he complete wLthou t
mention of the "effective U. S. con t r o l," (EUSC) ships.
A major and unresolved controversy centers about whether it would be
possible to use, at least for oil imports, the group of ships often re-
ferred to as effective U. S. control vessels -- ships registered under
foreign flags by U. S. owners who have agreed to make the vessels avail-
able during times of emergency. The EUSC fleet exists because, in return
L=
for a modest registration fee, the vessel owner is virtually free from ,I
U. S. taxation on ship's earnings and from government re~ulations con-
cerning operations, inspections, and crew-manning. EUSC shipping is also
often referred to as "flags of conven Lenc e'", but U. S. owner s of ships
under foreign registries prefer the term "flags of necessity."
Many traditional maritime nations -- the United States a notable
exception -- have domestic Laws that forbid their nationals to own and
operate ships under foreign registry. Under U. S. tax Laxrs , ship owner-s
do not have to pay taxes on earnings from foreign shipping subsidiaries
unless or until paid as dividends. This is an exception to the normal
treatment of a sales or service subsidiary and a major reason \-Jhy large
oil companies have found EUSC arrangements attractive.
The number of U. S. owned tankers under Liberian or Panamanian flags
is already significant, but the post \-Jar trend of the U. S. oil and rn~tals
industries to identify thenselves as multi-nationals or international
46
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companies has created a further development \Jhcrein U. S. owned vessels
are registered under the fl<lf,H of other traditionally maritime nations
and operate -- technically. at least. -- in the service of foreign sub-
1
sidiarics of American corporations.
The EUSC tanker fleet currently consists of 18 million DWT. and. withl
some 20 million DIIT under construction or on order. it is generally recog-
nized that these U. S. owned foreign flag ships have to be considered as
2
a substantial mohilization planninr, factor.
The EUSC Itdoctrine of effective control lt is based upon contracts and
agreements between the U. S. gove.rnmen t and owner s of flag-of-convenience
vessels. The Itlegal" basis for such contracts or agreements is derived
solely from domestic law of the United States; specifically. Section 902
of the Herchant :tarine Act of 1936. vhich gives the government authority
to requisition or purchase for government service any vessels owned by
citizens of the United States. Requisitioning is permitted only in the
event of a national em~rgency proclaimed by the President.
Unanswered, and untested. however. is the question ",hether the Unite
States does, in fact. have the "right" to requisition and take control of
vessels owned by U. S. citizens but registered under foreign flags.
lSubsidies -- Sea Power.
2Report of the Commission on American Shipbuilding
(Washington. D. C.: Government Printing Office, Octoher 1973).
.- _._-
There are also other factors to consider. The effective H. S. con-
trolled fleet has been dedicated by the maj or oil companies mostly to
supplying Europe and Japan. This in part is due to the size of the vcsselz
\/hich are too large to call at U. S. ports. This established trade pattern
whfch commits that fleet may not be disrupted easily without serious eco-
nomic and political repercussions should the U. S. attempt to requisition
the fleet in a transportation crisis. Further, any witl~rRwa1 of tankers
from Europe could have an adverse impact on the petroleum supplies vhLch
would support military and civilian needs of the European countries of the
1
;1ATO Alliance.
The extent of this dedication can be most readily understood by con-
sidering that the Euse fleet carried only 20 percent of U. S. oil imports
f
Therefore, more than I
exclusive I
I
In addition to the U. S. oil imports carried by the EUSe fleet,
U. S. flag tonnage accounted for another 4 percent.
three-quarters of U. S. oil imports were carried by foreign ships
in 1971.
2
of the EUSC fleet.
The security implications of reliance on EUSC and other foreign flag
ships are a particular concern to the U. S. Navy. Admiral E. R. ZumwaI t ,
Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, phrased the problem this way ;
lRobert J. B'l.ac kweLl , "Statement on EUSe Vessels," The Oceans
and National Economic Development (Hashington, D. C.: Government
Printing Office, December 197J), p. 254.
2Report of the Commission on Alnericnn Shipbuilding (Washington,
D. C.: Government Printing Office, October, 1973).
II
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The potential for coercion, v Lt h or wLt hout all Les ,
• • • is ominous • • • Plnnninr, for the protection
of tankers _'t s c.; !.:~ th,-, event a threat d eveLops
wou l d he g r ea t Ly enhanced by hav i ng Lar ge numbers
of ships under the lJ. S. flag in time of pence.
The Navy has a ~rf'ater requirement for merchant
ships than is eeneral1y recognized. For example,
merchant sh Ip s a r e ab so l.u t c Iy required to provide
the bulk of the DOD sealift and to augment our
amphibious forces. 1
To further emphas Lze the concern of Admiral Zumwa l t , it is evident
that \,fith risine Defense costs and constrained budgets, the U. S. combat
Navy has been forced to drastically reduce its number of active ships --
thus, with the compelling need to concentrate on improving its diminished
combat fleet, the Navy is nOH turning mo r e to the U. S. merchant marine 'I
for an increasing proportion of its logistic support. 2 To improve the
ability to perform these military support roles, U. S. f Ja g ships are built
with national defense features which increase their utility for military
cmplo)~ent and their self-defense capability. This includes such features
as extra speed, self-unloading capabilities, and strengthened decks.
In concluding, the following points should be considered when evalu-
ating the use of U. S. flag vessels versus EUSC and other foreign flag
} . 3sups:
lSee Subsidies -- Sea Power.
2p..ADM George H. Hiller, USN (Ret.), Remarks before The Propeller
Club of Charleston, South Carolina, 21 November 1973.
3Subsidies -- Sea Power.
.'.
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Indispntnble control of foreign-registered anel
foreign-manned ships cannot be Bssured.
The changing profile of the EUSC fleet t .rLth
emphasis on very Large and s pec Lnl.Lzed 011 and
bulk cnrriers, does not include a sufficient
inventor.y of "clean" tankers to carry the exotic
aviation, vehicle, and ship fuels used by U. S.
military forces.
Lack of national defense features in foreign-
built ships denigrates the military potential
of the EUSC fleet.
Foreign cr ews might be umTilling to man EUSC
ships during wartime operations.
In the event of war in whi ch the flag of registry
is not a participant, the alien n<lture of the ship
and crew precludes immediate deployment to I;upport
military oper.ations even if strategically located.
Such deplo)'l:lent is possible only when the ship be-
comes a belligerent, i.e., comes under U. S. or
allied registry.
The disruption of EUSC fleet foreign trade
patterns might cause serious economic and
political repercussions for allied and non-
aligned nations.
One fact is clear: the doctrine of "effective U. S. control" is an
untested concept. The changing military, political and economic orientation
of tooay's world requires, at the very least, a reevaluation of the EUSC
concept.
Ii
The Economic Ir,lpact
The f or ego Lng examples of the marine transportation system and rE'.-
lated industries, while cursory and incomplete, are sUBeestive of a
number of points:
That while the United States has been up to now
a leader in the development of marine commercial
technolo~y, the net effect has heen primarily ~ne
of export of this technolo~y to other nations.
Tha t a failure to ImpLemerrt this technology under
the U. S. flag. and an exploitation of this tech-
nology by other nations, has \-larked to the cor.J.-
mercial detriment of the United States merchant
marine.
That a suhstantial total economy can be developed
yhich is purely marine-oriented.
That the solution of a numher of coastal zone re-
lated problems may be inherent In such development.
Certainly many nations have moved extensively to the sea and the
coastal zone for bene f Lt of the economy , Fi~ure (10) bea r s out this
relationship. Belgium/Luxembourg, utilizing the deepwater harbor of
I Antwerp Imve nearly 50 percent of their gross national product involved
in export whLLe the ~:etherlands, \odtll its "Europort" at Rotterdam, has
nearly 40 percent of its gross national product so involved. As "ga t eway"
countries, this proportion is quite understandable.
1U. S. marine technology ,,,~dch has been exploited ahroad
includes the containership concept, barze-carrying ships, gas
turbines, steam turbines and boilers, automation, modular con-
struction and merchant ship nuclear propulsion. (See Congressional
Record (February 1, 1973), pp. E588-539.)
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Hore surprising is Japan. It is weLl, known t ha t Japan imports nearly
all of her raw materials and that her export/import balance is favorable.
~everthe1ess, her exports constitute only 10 percent of ller gross national
Iproduct. In addition, as shown in f Lgur e (11), her gross national product I
has for the past decade been linearly related to her exports. This cor- I
relation by itself woul.d not he significant except that its causality seems:
I
'Ijustified since it has been the conscious effort and expectati.on of Japanes~
economists and Japanese government and industry that this \lould result froJ
!
the economics of oc eanLc scale in their basic industries. 1 They recognize I
that efficiency in har dwar e production has its benefit in the release of I
!
manpower and resources for sof tware productivity. The total is reflected
The disproportionate percentage in
in the make-up of the gross na t Lona L product and in its growth rate. I
dicti::t:::te:::::a::n:nt:f:::::n:C::r:::_::::~C::::5::;5::e:::5:nn::::n01 I
I
product, one cannot refrain from comrnent Lng on some obvious characteristics,1
I
i
of which table (2) is demonstrative.
utilities and commercial activity and government is such that the European
market \-lith only one half the total gross na.tional product of the United
States has two thirds as much manufacturing, a nearly equal volume of
construction, and a slightly larger volume (dollar value) in agriculture.
Recognizing the distortions that price and efficiency play in equating
these factors it must be concluded that here is a substantial difference
in the hardware versus software and services mix of the two societies.
l U• S., Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers, Institute
for Hater Resources, Foreign Deep Hater Port Devclopment~, vo l., 3,
(Springfield, Virginia: National Technical Information Service,
December 1971).
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TABLE 2
NATIONAL GROSS DOHESTIC PRODUCT STRUCTURE -- 1969
France Belgium Netherlands Germany Italy U. K. U. S. A.
Percent
Hanufacturing 34.7% 30.4% 30.7% 39.n 27.3% 34.6% 28.1%
Agriculture 6.6 5.5 7.4 4.3 11.0 3.1 2.9
Construction 10.2 6.6 7.9 6.8 8.0 6.8 4.5
Mining .9 1.7 1.6 1.8 .7 1.8 1.6
Utilities 1.9 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.6 3.6 2.3 IConunercia1 36.8 46.4 41.8 36.4 38.5 43.0 46.5
Government 8.9 7.2 8.5 9.5 11. 9 7.1 14.1 I
I
Gross Domestic Product 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 I
~.,
~,
I
1
Billions of Dollars
Hanufacturing $ 44.9 $ 6.1 $ 7.0 $ 63.7 $ 19.9 $ 32.8 $265.0
Agriculture 8.6 1.1 1.7 7.0 8.0 2.9 27.4
I
ConRtruction 13.2 1.3 1.8 11.1 5.8 6.5 42.4
Nining 1.2 .3 .4 2.9 .5 1.7 15.1
Utilit ies 2.5 .4 .5 3.3 1.9 3.4 21.7
Commercial 47.7 9.4 9.5 59.2 28.0 40.8 438.5
Government 11.4 1.5 1.9 15.3 8.7 6.7 133.0
Gross Domestic Product 129.5 20.1 22.8 162.5 72 .8 94.8 9!13.0
SOURCE; Arthur D. Little, Inc , , Orr,anization for Economic Cooperation and Devel opmcnt , I
II
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RccognLz Lng further that the consumption of eneq~y and mat er Lal.s
cannot be met \.,rithout exogenous import wlrLch must in turn he paid for
by export of goods and services, then it is suggestive that our ability
to meet and expand our needs is a function not only of our nntional
ability to produce foods for export, but is also a function of the
relative efficiency and price at which these goods are produced. This
relative efficiency may in turn be related to the economies achieved
through the scale of marine industry.
The construction and expansion of the deepwater ports, primarily
for oil handling and storage and unitized cargo, at Rotterdam, AntHerp,
Amsterdam, LeHavre and Dunkirk attest to the idea that this conclusion
1has been reached by the European conmunLty , It is certainly the con-
c1usion of the Japanese.
I}Iarine Engineerin£{Loa (New York: Simmons Boardman Publishing
Corporation, June 1973), pp. 153-226.
I'
Summary
Ii
'\
!
Even though this paper has employed a broad perspective, there
appears to be enough evidence to sugbest that \1e examine as a nation
the effect of sea-based commerce and industry on the total economy
1
and the substance of the total economy. Certainly it has been the
clear policy of the Admini.stration to support and encourage such growth.
Yet this policy has been relatively frustrated by factors whLch have not
yet been brought into proper perspective. Although all tIle causes for
the failure of our marine transportation system to flourish on a world
scale are not yet fully understood, several factors can be cited as
contributory:
lIarine transportation systems do not operate
in a free and conpet Lt Lvc situation in tile
world mark~t. P.estrictive carriage and cargo
preference, as well as other national policies
Hhich have historically been exercised by the
more successful maritime nations, preclude
U. S. flag competition for wor Ld cargo. ~1ore
and more countries, by some form of preference
system, ~re reserving cargo for their merchant
marines. Among the leading nations of today,
1
The Second Annual Report (June 1973) of the National Advisory
Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere states (p. 5):
liThe decline of the t;. S. merchant marine and our groHing
dependence on foreign bottoms for shippinS, long deplored
from the vi~~oint of national security, deserves also to
be looked at from the point of view of the impact on our
place in the wo r Ld ec onomy ;"
2Report of the Commission on American Shipbui1dini:; (lJashington,
D. C.: Government Printing Office, October 1973).
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Russia carries at least 50 percent of her
foreign trade in her own flap,ship~; Japan
carries 46.6 percent; France, 38.3 percent;
Great Britian, 35 percent; Italy, 23.1 perrn~t;
Sweden, 22.3 percent; and the United States,
without preference support, carries, by com-
parison, 5.6 percent of its foreign trade. l
Competing attitudes by various Pederal agencies
concerning our domestic needs and foreign inter-
ests have tended to promote foreign marine
transport systems at the expense of our mID.
The Cargo Preference Act of 1954 generally re-
quires that at least 50 percent of government-
generated cargos be shipped on U. S. flag
vessels. Unfortunately, while the ~~ritiMe
Administration is attempting to promote U. S.
flag carriage, other agencies (such as Depart-
ment of Agriculture, Agency for International
Development, Inter-American Development Bank,
etc.) have administratively interpreted the 50
percent ~riteria as a maximum rather than a
minimum. Horeover, cargo preference has not
been effectively employed as a "policy" tool
to stimulate domestic shipping.
Foreign affiliates of U. S. corporations use
their foreign registered fleets to support
their oceanborne transportation needs. There-
fore, a significant amount of wor Ld cargo,
particularly energy fuels, is effectively
removed _from the competitive marketplace.
The vested interests of the multi-national
corporations serve to inhibit the partici-
pation, and indeed the size, of the U. S.
flag fleet in U. S. oceanborne commerce.
Restrictive, and conflicting, regulatory
statutes of Federal regulatory agencies
(Federal MaritiQc Commission and Inter-
state Commerce Conmission) have inhibited
the optimized movement of unitized cargos.
lRAD~1 George H. Miller, USN (Ret.), Remarks before The Propeller
Club of Charleston, South Carolina, 21 November 1973.
2s ee U. S., Congress, House, Report of the Activities of the
Harine and Fisheries Commi.ttee, 92d Corigr es s O-lashington, D. C.:
ment Printing Office, 1972), pp. 33-34; Sea Power (Hashington, D.
llavy League of the U. S., September 1973), pp. 16-17.
-I .--
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The benefits of industry-wide cooperation in
standardization, research, and the exchanp.e
of engineering and teclmicnl information are
significant in other countries, particularly
Japan. Similar benefits are largely denied
to U. S. shipbuilders because of the possi-
bility of antitrust action by the Government.
The environmental protective efforts have tended
to create a negative attitude inhibiting our
maritime advancement. These efforts have failed
to recognize that our gr owi.ng dependency upon
foreign flags coupled with our increasing ocean-
borne traffic do not provide the environmental
control inherent in U. S. carriage. The concern
expressed h;;!re relates to ship safety and en-
vironmentally designed and constructed transport
systems, including offshore terminals and off-
shore oil development.
In summary, the revitalization of our marine transportation system
is imperative wIlen measured in terms of the benefits to be derived by
our economic, political and military needs.
It is obvious that there are both competing and complementary
activities at wor k in the overall marine transportation system. It
is equally obvious that these many activities have not yet been ade-
quately defined or articulated, either quantitatively or qualitatively.
Also, it must be recognized that the U. S. as a mature technological
society, enjoying the highest standard of living in the world, has an
initial competitive disadvantage, vis-a-vis other nations. As is the
case with many other sectors of the economy, the marine transportation
sector has a higher operating cost than similar systems of otller nations.
But this disadvantage can be substantially reduced, if not altogether
removed, with increased maritime productivity -- and the U. S. maritime
industry possesses the requisite entrepreneuial and technological acumen.
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However, this brings us full circle, for to increase productivity to agree
with operating costs and market requirements and competition requires an
If this market is to be realized,
Central to this policy is the resolution of the concerns
it must be, ss in other countries, the result of a sustained and positive ~
Inational policy.
assured and well established market.
which have been cited throughout this paper.
l
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NLW Sri:!' TYPE j)ESIGtlATIm~S I
New ship type designations now in common use include:
ULCC and VLCC Ultra Large Crude Carriers (400,000 mIT and larger)
and Very Large Crude Carriers (200,000 to 400,000
mlT) • These liquid buLk supertankers provide very
economic transportation. Special areas of concern
include the need for expensive port facilities, en- I
vironmental precautions and efficient management ofl
the vehicle and its Lnt er Loc kcd distribution and
processing system.
OBO
CUNTAIHER
LNG
Ore/Bulk/Ore, a versatile carrier of moderate size
(about 100,000 g r os s tons), that can be rapidly
converted to any liquid or dry bulk cargo. Their
operations and routes are highly flexible and re- I
quire efficient schedulinp, and management.
,
These ships carry large interlocked boxes (containe~s)
of pre-packaged cargo. Container ships are the il
modern, fast packets, demanding rigid scheduling an~
high utilization. Port facilities are complex and II
expensive. Loads vary from 300 to 1,000 containers Ii
per ship with speeds typically 25 knots and on up t~
the middle 30' s , "
Liquified Natural Gas. These ships are the newest I
type, designed to transport natural gas in a super-I
cooled liquid form. Costs of these ships may ap- I
proach 100 million dollars. They have all the I
aspects of liquid petroleum carriers (pollution I
potential, scheduling, port facilities) plus ITlany
specialized needs of their own ,
LASH (or SEABEE) Lighter Aboard Ship Systems. (LASH is Prudential
Lines' design; SEABEE is Lykes' entry.) Lighters
(barges) are carried aboard these ships, being
loaded and unloaded by onboard elevators. Tugboats
handle the lJarges and deliver them to the desti-
nation user. Like containers, they are pre-packed.
Ships have very high productive utilization (short I
in port or cargo handlin8 periods) and do not re- I
quire specialized port facilities. The USH system I
employs barges of about 400 gross ton capacity II
viier eas t he SEABEE system uses barges of about; 750
ton capacity (one half the size of standard river
barges) •
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RO/RO
II
I
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Roll-on/Roll-off. Truck trailers are driven on and
off ship. In this specialized form of container I
R~~"fce. the cnr-go is pre-pncked and can be directl".
delivered or picked up hy truck or hy train/truck
combination5. Scheduling is important and 50me
specialized port facilities are needed.
'I
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